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THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974 AND UNION
INFLUENCE IN PENSION FUND
INVESTMENT DECISIONS
I. Introduction
Unions will eventually attempt to gain a voice in the direction of
the investment of pension funds to which their members contribute.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)l
contains provisions relating to fiduciary duty2 which may bar union
influence over the investment decision-making process. This Note
addresses the issue of whether a union-appointed fiduciary may influ-
ence investment decisions to incidentally benefit the union without
violating the fiduciary duty provisions of ERISA.3 The focus is upon
the decision-making process and the factors which influence it.
4
Though the influence may be indirect, the fiduciary duty provisions of
ERISA still apply. 5 Unions will not attempt to 'control' pension funds
for their own benefit, but rather will attempt to influence the large
1. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1976).
2. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1976).
3. Most of the commentators in this area have addressed the issue in terms of
"social investing", that is, whether a fiduciary may consider "social criteria" in
making investment decisions. See, e.g., Lynn, Investing Pension Funds for Social
Goals Requires Changing the Law, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 101 (1981); Langbein and
Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72 (1980); Hut-
chinson and Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment of Pension Assets for Social
and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1340 (1980); Bowers, Social Investing-
Practicable or Not?, PENSION WORLD, June, 1980, at 19; Schotland, Should Pension
Funds be Used to Achieve "Social" Goals?, (pts. 1, 2 and 3), TRS. & EsTs., Sept.
1980, at 10, TRs. & ESTS., Oct. 1980, at 27, TRs. & ESTS., Nov. 1980 at 26; Lanoff,
The Social Investment of Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be Done Lawfully
Under ERISA?, 31 LAB. L.J. 387 (1980).
This Note is concerned solely with investment decisions which incidentally, or
indirectly, benefit unions. Broader "social" goals are not considered.
4. This Note is not concerned with who ultimately "controls" the pension fund,
but with the narrower issue of which factors may influence the investment decision-
making process. The issue of ultimate "control" is impossible to resolve, considering
the multiple sources of influence over pension funds, i.e., the corporation, the union,
the bank, the investment advisor, etc. A recent survey of the federal law concerning
union attempts to "control" pension funds may be found in Kaiser, Labor's New
Weapon: Pension Fund Leverage, Can Labor Legally Beat Its Plowshares Into
Swords?, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 409 (1982).
5. The fiduciary duty provisions of ERISA are broad. See infra note 52.
0
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financial institutions which invest the funds to consider the question of
whether a possible investment will provide job security for union
members. An examination of the relevant legislative history,6 along
with court interpretations of statutes with provisions similar to those
contained in ERISA,7 leads to a conclusion that such indirect and
limited influence is legal under ERISA. The 'pro-union' policy should
be a factor, not a mandate.8 Such a moderate approach by unions will
avoid ERISA fiduciary duty violations," and will not jeopardize the
retirement income security of employees.10
The resources commanded by private pension funds" are vast.
There are approximately 450,000 private pension plans in the United
States.' 2 Pension funds, including both public and private, are the
largest single source of funds for the New York Stock Exchange. 13
Pension funds acquire almost two-thirds of the new stocks and bonds
issued by corporations in capital markets. 14 In 1982, public and pri-
vate pension funds invested $36 billion in corporate stocks and
bonds.' 5 The forecast is for a growth of total assets of private plans
from the present amount of over $400 billion 16 to $3 trillion by 1995.17
Pension funds in the private sector are concentrated: approximately
6. See infra notes 102-103.
7. See infra notes 108, 114, 128, 132, 159 and 164, and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 107, 124, 154 and 169, and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 86, 108, 123 and 164 and accompanying text.
10. See infra 86, 117, 118 and 124 and accompanying text.
11. "Pension funds" here refers to the assets held by employee benefit plans,
including both welfare plans and pension plans. "Welfare plans" are those plans,
funds or programs which provide medical benefits, training programs, daycare
centers, prepaid legal services, or insurance. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1976).
12. Department of Labor, Preliminary Estimates of Participant and Financial
Characteristics of Private Pension Plans, 1977 (Government Printing Office, 1981).
This Note is not concerned with public pension plans, i.e., federal or state, since
"governmental" plans are specifically excluded from coverage. See 29 U.S.C. §
1003(b).
13. L. LITVAK, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC RENEWAL 1 (1981).
14. Id.
15. USA TODAY, April 13, 1983, at B1. Private pension funds accounted for $15.7
billion. Id.
16. A. MUNNEL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 1 (1982).
17. Lanoff, supra note 3, at 387; Kaiser, supra note 4, at 409. Accumulated
pension funds are growing at a rate of ten percent per year. Lynn, Private Pensions in
Perspective: Problems of the Years Ahead, 15 GA. L. REV. 269, 305 n.68. Assets of the
average individually managed pension fund rose 24.1 percent in 1982. 10 PENS. REP.
(BNA) No. 437, at 552 (March 28, 1983). Two-thirds of the cash flow to pension
plans will derive from profits on investments by 1995. Kaiser, supra note 4, at 410.
Contributions to private plans already totalled $70 billion a year by 1980. A. MUN-
NEL, supra note 16, at vii.
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1600 of the largest corporations account for about 80 percent of all
pension funds in the corporate market. 8
Additionally, approximately one-half of the labor force partici-
pates'" in private pension plans subject to ERISA's coverage.2 0
Investment decisions of private pension plans have great ramifica-
tions for the economic future of the nation and the retirement security
of beneficiaries. 2'
II. Types of Pension Funds and Their Financial Structure
A. Categorization of Pension Plans
Private pension plans can be broken down into four main types:
corporate plans, single-employer Taft-Hartley plans, multi-employer
Taft-Hartley plans, and union plans.2 2 Corporate plans 23 are either
sponsored by the employer unilaterally or established through collec-
tive bargaining with a union. 24 The fact that a corporation has estab-
lished a pension plan pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
does not necessarily lead to union involvement in the administration
of the plan, or a union voice in the direction of pension funds.25 The
vast majority of pension funds in the United States are corporate plans
18. 10 PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 427, at 95 (Jan. 17, 1983).
19. Department of Labor, Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 1978 Re-
port to Congress 53.
20. Lynn, supra note 17, at 277. Private pensions cover 96% of the workers in
firms of 500 or more workers, 78% of the jobs in firms of between 100 and 500
workers, and 46% of the jobs in firms of under 100 workers. [July-Dec.] PENS. REP.
(BNA) No. 315, at A-17 (Nov. 3, 1980) (statement by Thomas S. Boyd, Jr., legislative
advisor on employee relations, Mobil Oil Company).
21. In the Findings and Declaration of Policy contained in 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(1976) Congress found a "national public interest" in employee benefit plans, and
"that the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their
dependents are directly affected by these plans ......
The actual benefits to beneficiaries has not risen dramatically. In real terms, the
average annual benefit was $1,300 in 1950 and $1,550 in 1974. The costs to employ-
ers have, in contrast, risen from $300 per covered worker in 1950 to $720 in 1975, in
constant dollars. D. LOGUE, LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE PENSION PLANS 6
(1979).
22. P. HARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC PowER 43-45 (1959).
23. For a discussion of corporate plans, see generally D. LOGUE, LEGISLATIVE
INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE PENSION PLANS (1979).
24. P. HARBRECHT, supra note 22, at 43.
25. Id. at 43-44.
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in which the union does not have any input into the investment
decision-making process, either through the selection of trustees 26 or
investment m'anagers. 27
Unions have some input into the direction of pension funds when
those funds are established pursuant to Section 302(c)(5) of the Taft-
Hartley Act. 28 Section 302(c)(5) provides for the establishment of
trusts jointly administered by "representatives" of the employer and
employees. 29 The board of trustees in such a "Taft-Hartley plan" is
comprised of one-half employer appointees and one-half union ap-
pointees. 30 If a pension plan is established and the union is to partici-
pate in administering the plan, the pension plan must be established
according to the rules of Taft-Hartley and the equal representation
provisions apply. 31 However, only a portion of private pension plan
assets are in fact subject to joint administration-estimates range from
10% to 15% .32 One estimate is that there are 1,117 Taft-Hartley
plans, with an aggregate total of $34 billion. 33 Taft-Hartley plans
themselves are of two types: single-employer plans and multi-em-
ployer plans. 34 Single-employer Taft-Hartley plans are more common
than multi-employer plans, 35 although the latter are increasing in
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (1976) provides that "all assets of an employee benefit plan
shall be held in trust by one or more trustees." See infra notes 29-30 and accompany-
ing text.
27. See Ruttenberg, Union Involvement in Socially Responsible Investments, irq
LEGAL ISSUES IN PENSION INVESTMENT 345, 347 (H. Pianko ed. 1980).
28. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187
(1976).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1976). Section 302 generally makes it illegal for an
employer to make any payments to a union. Section 302(c)(5) provides that trust
funds and welfare funds are exempt. See discussion infra notes 160-163 regarding the
purpose of the provision.
30. See 29 U.S.C. §186(c)(5) (1976).
31. N. LEVIN, ERISA AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT BENEFIT FUNDs 4 (1975).
32. Excerpt.from AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department Report on Benefit Fund
Investment Policies, reprinted in [Jan.-June] PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 294, at R-7 (June
9, 1980) [hereinafter cited as AFL-CIO Report on Investment Policies]. The twenty-
five largest jointly administered pension plans hold only $11 billion in assets.
Schotland, Should Pension Funds Be Used to Achieve "Social" Goals?, TRs. & ESTS.,
Sept. 1980, at 11.
33. See Schotland, Investing Pensions for Social or Union Purposes: Legal Analy-
sis, in EMPLOYEE RELATIONS AND REGULATION IN THE '80's 429 (H. Northrup and R.
Rowan eds. 1982).
34. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
35. Multi-employer plans covered 22% of all private plan participants in 1980,
and this percentage has been increasing steadily. A. MUNNEL, supra note 16, at 219.
Multi-employer plans covered only 9% of private plan participants in 1950. Id.
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importance. 36 Multi-employer plans are sponsored by an association of
employers, generally within a single industry, who contribute to the
plan at a collectively-bargained rate. 37 The contributions of the em-
ployers are pooled and the often massive trust fund is jointly adminis-
tered by the employer and employee representatives. 38
The union often has defacto control over the decisions of the board
of trustees of Taft-Hartley plans. 39 Where employers are fragmented,
as often occurs in multi-employer plans, 40 the union-appointed trust-
ees, voting as a bloc on the board of trustees, can influence the
investment policy by choosing an investment manager. 4'
The fourth type of plan, the union plan, is sponsored exclusively by
a union. 42 These plans were outlawed by Taft-Hartley 43 and now
comprise less than one-tenth of all private pension plan funds. 44
B. The Financial Structure of Pension Plans
Pension funds are invested in two basic ways: through group annu-
ity contracts offered by life insurance companies or through trusts
administered by a bank or trust company. 45 Pension trusts held 63
percent of pension fund assets in 1980.46 A bank or insurance company
36. Id.
37. Id. "While multiemployer plans usually provide less generous benefits than
single-employer plans, they offer workers retirement income security by allowing
them to retain pension credits as they move among participating employers. More-
over, they protect a worker's benefit even [though] his employer may leave the plan".
id.
38. See P. HARBRECHT, supra note 22, at 44.
39. Blodgett, Union Pension Fund Management, in ABUSE ON WALL STREET:
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS 321-329 (1980); Pension Fund
Investment Policies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders
Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22
(1978) (statement of Prof. Roy Schotland) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; N. LEVIN,
EmSA AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT BENEFIT FUNDS 226-27 (1975).
40. See Blodgett, supra note 39, at 330 (fears erosion of distinction between funds
and unions).
41. Id.
42. See P. HARBRECHT, supra note 22, at 45.
43. An employer cannot pay money to a union unless the payments are held in
trust and subject to joint administration. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1976). Any union
plans in effect before the enactment of Taft-Hartley would be legal.
44. M. COSTA, MASTER TRUST-SIMPLIFYING EMPLOYEE BENEFITS TRUST FUND AD-
MINISTRATION 7 (1980).
45. A. MUNNEL, supra note 16, at 217.
46. Id.
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holding pension funds for a corporate plan not subject to Section
302(c)(5) of Taft-Hartley is a fiduciary of the plan 47 and often the
trustee of the pension fund. Outside firms often act as investment
managers 4 for the trustee and the sponsor company. 4
In the case of a Taft-Hartley plan, a bank or insurance company
holding pension funds acts as an investment advisor or manager, not
as a trustee.50 The trustees are the representatives of the employer and
employees. 51 The bank or insurance company holding pension funds is
a fiduciary with regard to the plan. 52
A number of large companies manage their own pension funds 'in
house', whereas smaller companies generally employ a commercial
bank trust department to oversee the management of the fund. 3 If a
corporation does manage its pension fund 'in house', this may lead to
conflicts with ERISA's mandates regarding fiduciary obligations.5 4
The fiduciary duty problems of corporate pension fund officials are
similar to those of union officials serving as trustees in a Taft-Hartley
fund: that of dual loyalties.5 5 In many cases the fund trustees are
47. See infra note 52 for the definition of fiduciary.
48. An investment manager is defined in ERISA as any fiduciary "who has the
power to manage, acquire, or dispose of any asset of a plan . . .", and either is
"registered as an adviser under the Investment Adviser Act of 1940 . . .", or is a bank
as defined in that Act or is an insurance company with managing powers under the
laws of more than one state. The fiduciary status must be acknowledged in writing.
29 U.S.C. § 1002 (38) (1976). See also Questions and Answers Relating to Fiduciary
Responsibility, 29 C.F.R. § 2509. 75-5 (1982) (Questions FR-6 and FR-7 further
explicate 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (38) (1976)).
49. The onset of ERISA caused many corporate plan sponsors to hire consulting
firms, although this trend is declining somewhat. Rohrer, Tough Times for the
Consultants, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, March 1983, at 103.
50. The trustees are appointed by both the union and management under Taft-
Hartley. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
52. ERISA defines a fiduciary as one who "exercises any discretionary authority or
control" over a plan or its assets, gives investment advice for a fee, or has any
discretionary authority in the plan's administration. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (21) (A)
(1976).
53. A. MUNNEL, supra note 16, at 217. There are administrative and investment
advantages in establishing a large trust fund in a single bank for large corporations.
In a "master trust", the plans of a corporation and its subsidiaries are consolidated.
M. COSTA, supra note 44, at 25.
54. If a corporation does manage its pension fund 'in house', there may be im-
proved investment performance although 'active management' may lead to conflicts
with ERISA's mandates regarding fiduciary obligations. J. Klein, Structuring and
Managing the Investment Process, in LEGAL ISSUES IN PENSION INVESTMENT 9, 31-40
(1981).
55. For a discussion of 'dual loyalties', see notes 156-171 infra and accompanying
text.
[Vol. XII
1984] PENSION INVESTMENT
company managers, 5 raising the possibility of self-dealing. It is quite
common, for example, for corporate pension funds to invest in the
corporation's own real estate.5 7 Many corporate pension funds, how-
ever, maintain a policy of not investing in the sponsor corporation. 58
III. The Activities Proposed by Organized Labor
Only a fraction of private pension plan assets are subject to joint
administration as trusts established pursuant to Section 302(c)(5) of
Taft-Hartley.59 In the case of a Taft-Hartley plan,60 the employees
and the employer are represented equally in the administration of the
trust.61 A union could attempt to attain joint administration of the
fund with the employer through collective bargaining.62 If unable to
obtain full joint administration, a union could attempt to participate
in crucial decisions concerning the pension fund, such as the selection
of fund trustees, the choice of investment managers and advisers, and
the determination of the general investment policy of the fund. 63 The
method of gaining a voice in these decisions is an agreement with the
56. J. BROOKS, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CORPORATE PENSION FUND ASSET MANAGE-
MENT 16 (1975).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 15.
59. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
61. A trust fund's trustees are bound by the provisions of the document creating
the trust. Under Sinai Hospital of Baltimore Inc. v. National Benefit Fund for
Hospital and Health Care Employees, 697 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1982), the trustees are
governed by provisions of the trust agreement and could not be bound by contract
provisions of a subsequent collective bargaining agreement. The trustees of the multi-
employer Taft-Hartley fund in Sinai Hospital decided to increase benefits on a
nationwide basis, despite the fact that the union had negotiated a freeze on benefits.
It is noteworthy that an "intimate relationship existed between the Union and the
Fund. ... 697 F.2d at 569 (Russell, J., dissenting). The employers in Sinai Hospi-
tal should have required the trust fund to bind itself contractually to the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, in order to protect themselves against the trustees'
disregard of the agreement.
62. See AFL-CIO Report on Investment Policies, supra note 32, at R-8; Commit-
tee on Investment of Union Pension Funds, Recommendations to AFL-CIO Execu-
tive Council on New Pension Fund Investment Initiatives, reprinted in [July-Dec.]
PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 305, R-16, at R-17 (Aug. 25, 1980).
63. Committee on Investment of Union Pension Funds, supra note 62, at R-17.
Another option is the utilization of share-ownership voting rights. Id. See generally
Kaiser, supra note 4, at 414-15 (discussion of various types of "pension fund lever-
age").
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employer reached through the process of collective bargaining.6 4 In
any of the above types of union participation, the union's representa-
tive would become a fiduciary with respect to the plan. 65
Pension funds normally are invested in either group annuity con-
tracts offered by life insurance companies or trusts administered by a
bank or trust company. 66 These firms will be referred to as "money
managers". Unions are attempting to direct the money managers to
consider "pro-union" factors in certain circumstances when making
investment decisions.6 7 The thrust of organized labor's proposals is
that union participation in pension fund management will benefit
union members.68 Benefits will be achieved through "reindustrializa-
tion" of crucial sectors of the nation's economy, such as the manufac-
turing, construction, transportation, and maritime areas. 9 These ar-
eas are highly unionized and contain the largest percentage of workers
covered by private pension plans.70 Benefits will include improved
housing for workers.7 ' Most importantly, investment decisions will be
influenced in order to preserve jobs for union members. 2 This in-
64. AFL-CIO Report on Investment Policies, supra note 32, at R-8 ("[U]nions
must obtain some formal measure of control over investment-related decisions. Col-
lective bargaining is peculiarly well suited to this end").
The trend towards union participation is a nascent one. Consider the following
colloquy between Senator Metzenbaum and William Winpisinger, President, Inter-
national Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers:
Senator Metzenbaum: Do you see the whole question of bargaining for pension
rights, the question of the management of pension funds, and the question of giving
direction to the money managers becoming more and more an issue of collective
bargaining not only in the Machinists Union but in other labor organizations as well?
Mr. Winpisinger: I think it is absolutely inevitable at this stage of the game.
Hearings, supra note 39, at 133.
65. ERISA's definition of a fiduciary is broad. See supra note 52.
66. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
68. Id.
69. See Committee on Investment of Union Pension Funds, supra note 62, at R-16.
70. A. MUNNEL, supra note 16, at 199. The lowest percentage of covered workers
is in the largely non-union service and retail industries. Id. Most non-covered workers
are employed by small businesses. Id. at 200.
71. See Committee on Investment of Union Pension Funds, supra note 62, at R-16.
The AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades Department has the backing of
mortgage bankers and real estate investment advisors in the investment of pooled,
nationally invested pension funds. The plan's goal is to generate jobs in the construc-
tion industry. The fifteen member trade unions participate in the management of
approximately $60 billion in pension funds. 9 PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 404, at 1090
(Aug. 2, 1982).
72. See Hearings, supra note 39, at 142 (Statement of Jacob Sheinkman, Secre-
tary-Treasurer, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union).
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volves inhibiting the flow of capital from the heavily unionized north-
ern parts of the country to mostly non-unionized southern firms. 73
Jobs also will be preserved by investing in firms that "create or foster
domestic employment", 74 rather than firms which invest overseas. 75
The collective bargaining process may give unions influence over
the investment decision-making process by, for example, the negotia-
tion of a joint employer-employee committee 76 to either select trustees
or investment managers. More importantly, a union may bargain for
a joint employer-employee committee to determine investment policy.
Since pension funds are most often turned over to money managers, 77
the union essentially is bargaining over the right to make recommen-
dations to the firm holding those funds regarding the direction of the
investments. If the plan is a Taft-Hartley plan, the employees, in the
form of the union, already have such influence because one-half of the
trustees are employee representatives.7 8 Assuming that the money
manager accepts the directives, 79 the unresolved issue is whether the
union-appointed trustee (of a Taft-Hartley plan) or a union-appointed
fiduciary of the plan (e.g., a member of a bargained-for committee on
73. See Axelrod, Common Obstacles to Organizing Under the NLRA: Combatting
the Southern Strategy, 59 N.C. L. Rev. 147 (1980); See also BLUESTONE, HARRISON,
AND BAKER, CORPORATE FLIGHT: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC DIs-
LOCATION 15 (1981) (Southern manufacturing stock grew almost twice as fast as did
that of the Northeast, and two-thirds faster than the North Central region, from 1960
to 1976).
74. AFL-CIO Report on Investment Policies, supra note 32, at R-7.
75. United States tax-exempt institutions had $10.9 billion invested in interna-
tional markets, as of January 1, 1983. Pensions and Investment Age, May 30, 1983 at
21, col. 2.
76. A recent Chrysler-United Auto Workers agreement provided for a joint com-
mittee to recommend "socially responsible investments" and to advise against invest-
ments in up to five firms doing business in South Africa. (Jan.-June) PENS. REP.
(BNA) No. 374, at R-9 (Jan. 4, 1982).
77. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
79. Investment managers may not always follow instructions. See Crawford,
Prudent Investments for Plan Fiduciaries and Plan Administrators, 40 INST. ON FED.
TAX. § 5.01, § 5.04, at 5-33 (ERISA Supp., 1982) ("investment managers would
generally adopt the approach that investments are made on the basis of their finan-
cial merit and that other factors such as social or political considerations or a strong
inclination on the part of the client toward particular types of investments would not
play a role in the decision-making process"); Hearings, supra note 39, at 171 (State-
ment of Harrison V. Smith, Executive Vice-President, Morgan Guaranty Trust Com-
pany); Bowers, Social Investing-Practicable or Not?, PENSION WORLD, June 1980, at
22.
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investments) may influence investment decisions so as to incidentally
benefit union members, without violating ERISA's provisions on fidu-
ciary duty.
IV. Arguments Against Union Influence
There are a number of arguments against the union bid for influ-
ence over the investment decision-making process. Some commenta-
tors conclude that under the present law, unions would be violating
ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions s.8 These analyses include the union
bid as falling under the rubric of "social investing".8' Many of the
arguments for and against union influence over the investment deci-
sion-making process contain non-legal, value-laden approaches. One
of these arguments is that unions will attempt to "control" pension
funds for their own benefit 2 and subsidize union objectives with
pension funds.83 Other commentators argue that "social" investing is
mandatory. 84
80. Langbein and Posner, supra note 3, at 96; Hutchinson and Cole, supra note 3,
at 1384-86; Lynn, supra note 3, at 114-15.
81. See supra note 3.
82. For example, one commentator has suggested that advocates of "social invest-
ing" should be labelled "anti-retiree", since "the advocates who anoint themselves
with the more affirmative labels usually simply ignore retirement income security,
sometimes assign it a new, low priority, and always recommend courses of action
that are likely (to say the least) to impair retirement security." Schotland, Investing
Pensions for Social or Union Purposes: A Legal Analysis, in EMPLOYEE RELATIONS AND
RECULATION IN THE '80's 411 (H. Northrop and R. Rowan eds. 1982).
83. Northrup, Investing Pension Assetsfor Social or Union Purposes: Management
Analysis, in EMPLOYEE RELATIONS AND REGULATION IN THE '80'S, supra note 82, at
455. A recent study commissioned but quickly withdrawn by the Department of
Labor stated that "social investing" could "undermine the rationality and efficiency
of capital-markets, by substituting subjective (indeed, essentially arbitrary) criteria
of 'social responsibility' for the objective criterion of profitability". Pensions and
Investment Age, May 30, 1983, at 46, col. 4. See discussion in 10 PENS. REP. (BNA)
No. 445, at 900 (May 23, 1983).
84. See M. LEIBIG, infra note 123. Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan has
recently stated: "We will not allow increased risk or decreased returns by so-called
social investments, even those which may have the noblest of purposes". Donovan,
Effective Administration of ERISA, 33 LAB. L.J. 131, 132 (1982).
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A different approach would be to focus upon limited union involve-
ment and purely legal issues.85 Senator Williams, who was a central
figure in the establishment of ERISA's rules on fiduciary duties, stated
in 1979 that collateral benefits are permissible under ERISA as it is
written.8 His remarks are noteworthy: -[M]y understanding of ERI-
SA's fiduciary provisions and the intent of the Congress that enacted
ERISA leads me to conclude that there is no need to amend ERISA's
rules to permit fiduciaries . . .to consider the social desirability of
investments-the present rules permit such consideration . 87
V. The Pension Plan Law of Fiduciary Duty
A. The Governing Law
The field of private pensions is imbricated with federal statutes
applicable to specific areas. 88 Congress' most extensive effort to date in
this field has been the enactment of ERISA, which preempted all state
regulation of private pension plans. 89 ERISA is an unprecedented,
comprehensive statute and the fiduciary duty provisions discussed in
85. Moral or policy issues, concerning whether unions should have any influence
over the investment decision-making process, are beyond the scope of this Note. Some
of the non-legal arguments against such influence are worthy of mention. It has been
stated that "the most publicized, and perhaps the most flagrant, fiduciary scandals of
recent years have occurred in connection" with multi-employer Taft-Hartley funds.
J. BROOKS, supra note 56, at 5. There is also the question of what have the unions
accomplished where they already have a voice, as in Taft-Hartley funds. See Profes-
sor Schotland's trenchant critique in Schotland, supra note 82, at 428-29.
86. 125 CONG. REC. 932-33 (1974).
87. Id.
"[T]he framework of ERISA's present fiduciary responsibility rules ...
permits taking non-economic issues into consideration when investment
decisions are being made." A fiduciary might, "in order to implement a
non-economic policy that is in the interest of the plan participants ...
exclude investments of a certain type, or in a particular company ...
while not adversely affecting in any measurable way the plan's actual
investment alternatives and available investment returns." "... ERISA's
fiduciary rules were deliberately made flexible enough to accommodate
the almost infinite variety of types and sizes of plans, and offer ample
opportunities . . . to accommodate social purpose objectives of partici-
pants and beneficiaries."
Id.
88. These include Taft-Hartley, supra note 28, and the Internal Revenue Code.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (1976).
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this Note are only a portion of the Act. 0 The Internal Revenue Code
also contains numerous provisions applicable to private pension
plans.9' The most recent changes are contained in the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act.9 2
B. ERISA and Fiduciary Duties
ERISA's provisions regarding fiduciary duties can be summarized as
three rules. 3 First, the fiduciary must act for the "exclusive purpose"
of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries. 4 In addition,
the fiduciary is held to a standard of prudence, considered in the light
of "the circumstances then prevailing," as one acting in a similar
capacity and "familiar with such matters. 9°5 Finally, the fiduciary
90. ERISA's coverage is broad. The Act provides for involved reporting and
disclosure requirements, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, minimum participation and vest-
ing of benefits standards, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061, minimum plan funding standards,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086, the fiduciary standards discussed in this Note, 29 U.S.C. §§
1101-1114, and administration and enforcement 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1144. The Act
also provides for the establishment of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC), which guarantees benefits, upon the termination of a plan, 29 U.S.C. §§
1301-1368. ERISA was amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments
Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1461 (1980). The latter Act also amended numerous
sections of the Internal Revenue Code.
91. Title II of ERISA amended the Internal Revenue Code. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201
et seq. (1976). Most crucially, qualified pension plans under the Internal Revenue
Code are exempt from federal taxation. See I.R.C. § 501. The requirements for
qualification are contained in I.R.C. § 401(a).
92. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1981). TEFRA has
been criticized as potentially weakening the private pension plan system. Gropper,
The Furor Over TEFRA, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1983, at 71.
93. The pertinent provisions are as follows:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries;
and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circum-
stances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a
like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk
of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to
do so. ...
29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a) (1) (1976).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a) (1) (A) (1976).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a) (1) (B) (1976).
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must minimize the risk of large losses by diversifying the plan's invest-
ments, unless it is clearly prudent not to do so under the circum-
stances.96 Each of these rules must be followed "solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries - . . .
Congress intended that a federal common law of fiduciary duty
develop on the basis of ERISA's provisions.9 8 Some of the principles of
the common law of trusts were codified and made applicable to
fiduciaries by ERISA. 99 Analogously, Section 302(c)(5) of the Taft-
Hartley Act was intended by Congress "to cast employee benefit plans
in traditional trust form precisely because fiduciary standards long
established in equity would best protect employee beneficiaries."'' 00
The standards were set forth to prevent self-interested manipulations
of the fund by fiduciaries. '01 It is apparent from the legislative history
that Congress was concerned about manipulations of the fund by
"insiders." 102 A union which obtains some influence over the invest-
ment decision-making process becomes an "insider." 103 Manipulation
96. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a) (1) (C) (1976).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a) (1) (1976).
98. S. REP. No. 127, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973), reprinted in 1 SENATE
SUBCOMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 615 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ERISA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
99. Standards of fiduciary duty were placed in ERISA to "bring a measure of
uniformity in an area where decisions under the same set of facts may differ from
state to state". S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973), reprinted in 1 ERISA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 615.
See Lamon, Professional Money Managers: Fiduciary Responsibility under ERISA,
11 REAL PROP. PROR. & TR. J. 519, 520 (1976).
100. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 331 (1981). Some commentators
have rejected this dependence upon the common law of trusts as inadequate. See
generally Herbert, Investment Regulation and Conflicts of Interest in Employer-
Managerial Pension Plans, 17 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 127, 157 (1976) (state courts
have never been able to specify which investments are appropriate); Note, Fiduciary
Standards and the Prudent Man Rule Under the Employment (sic) Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, 88 HARV. L. REV. 960, 967-69 (1975) (Congress did not
intend for courts to rely only upon the common law since common law trusts differ in
nature from pension trusts).
101. "(T)rustees and managers of plans have not always been above manipulating
or investing funds for their own gain rather than in the interest of the beneficiary
.... 120 CONG. REC. H4278 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1974) (statement of Rep. Perkins),
reprinted in 2 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 3370. "Workers'
pension funds deserve strong fiduciary protections to insure that their interests are
not subordinated to the self-enriching intrigues of 'insiders' to the plan". 120 CONG.
REC. S29,951 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in 3 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
supra note 98, at 4795 (statement of Senator Bentsen).
102. See statement of Senator Bentsen supra note 101.
103. Id.
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of the fund for the benefit of a union or an individual is therefore the
type of egregious activity which the fiduciary duty provisions were
designed to prevent. 04 However, a union which has bargained for a
joint employer-employee committee to determine investment policy
will have obtained merely the ability to recommend that the money
managers take "pro-union" factors into account when alternative in-
vestments are approximately equal in economic terms. Such indirect
influence over the investment process is very different from the ma-
nipulative activity which the fiduciary duty provisions were designed
to prevent.
1. The Exclusive Benefit Rule
If a union-appointed trustee or fiduciary were to follow, or direct a
bank to follow, a policy of investing only in unionized companies, this
policy would not be for the sole and exclusive benefit of the plan's
participants. 05 An investment policy must be narrowly formulated if
it is to survive scrutiny by a court under the exclusive benefit rule. The
"invest union" instruction should only be one factor to be considered
by the investment decisionmakers. 06 Investment decisions are made
on the basis of items of information which increase the probability
that an investment will perform in a certain manner. 0 7 The "invest
union" variable would be one of many, and should not be considered
if an investment's performance would be poorer as a result.
104. In the recent unreported case of Donovan v. Wheeler, No. C82-640L (D.C.
N.H. 1983), a pension fund violated the exclusive benefit rule where a contractor was
loaned money by the fund on condition that only union members be employed.
Wheeler is discussed in 10 PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 455, at 1257 (Aug. 1, 1983).
105. See Hutchinson and Cole, supra note 3, at 1368 n. 143 ("union officials may
have difficulty proving ... that a policy of investing only in unionized companies is
intended to benefit the participants as workers rather than the union itself").
Such a formulation would probably result in a violation of the duty to diversify
assets under 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(C). See generally Langbein and Posner, supra
note 3, at 89 (such a policy would produce a regional bias in the investment portfolio,
since unionized companies are concentrated in the northeast and midwest).
106. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
107. Dym, A New Look at Investment Decision-Making Models, PENSION WORLD,
Oct. 1982, at 47.
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The fact that a fiduciary's actions ultimately result in an incidental
benefit to a third party does not violate the exclusive benefit rule per
se. 108 The Internal Revenue Code contains an exclusive benefit rule. 09
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that (1) the provision is not
violated where the primary purpose of benefiting participants is
met, ' 0 and that (2) the rule allows others to derive some benefit from
a transaction with the trust."' The rule is not violated where the
following requisites are met: 1) The cost of the investment does not
exceed the fair market value at the time of purchase; 2) A fair return
commensurate with the prevailing rate is provided; 3) Sufficient li-
quidity is maintained to allow for disbursements; and 4) Prudent
safeguards and diversity levels are maintained."12
The I.R.S. has also ruled that "[1]ow risk investments that produce
income and also serve a social purpose will not be considered a diver-
sion of the corpus or income from the trust's purposes even though
such investments yield a rate of return lower than that in the current
market.""'  The United States Tax Court has stated that incidental
benefits may accrue to persons other than participants in the plan as a
108. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982). In Donovan, corpo-
rate officers and directors, who were also trustees of the pension fund, breached their
fiduciary duties by not resigning during a takeover bid and by buying their own
corporation's stock with pension plan assets to ward off the bid. The court noted that
"[a]lthough officers of a corporation who are trustees of its pension plan do not
violate their duties as trustees by taking action which, after careful and impartial
investigation, they reasonably conclude best to promote the interests of participants
and beneficiaries simply because it incidentally benefits the corporation . . . their
decisions must be made with an eye single to the interests of the participants and
beneficiaries." Id. at 271 (citations omitted); Schwartz, The Use of Employee Benefit
Plans in Corporate Take-Overs After Grumman, in ERISA LITIGATION 169 (1982).
The Department of Labor is planning a crackdown on the misuse of pension funds in
corporate takeovers. Pensions and Investment Age, May 30, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
109. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (1976). Compliance with the rule is a requirement for a
pension plan to enjoy tax-exempt status.
110. Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. 88.
111. Id.
112. Id. It is possible that the exclusive benefit rule is preempted by the standards
of prudence, discussed infra. In the legislative history of ERISA, it is stated that
Congress intended that to the extent a fiduciary meets the prudent man standard, "he
will be deemed to meet these aspects of the exclusive benefit requirements under the
Internal Revenue Code". H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 301, reprinted in
3 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 98, at 4569.
113. Rev. Rul. 70-536, 1970-2 C.B. 120. Contra McNamara, Fiduciary Responsi-
bility and Investment Limitations, 9 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 451, 453 (1974)
(primary purpose test may no longer be valid in light of ERISA's addition of 'solely in
the interest' language).
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result of a pension fund investment. 114 The proposition has been stated
only in cases involving a corporation or its shareholders. The language
of ERISA itself appears to prevent assets of a pension plan from being
used for the benefit of an employer, and not for a union. 1 5 The
policies behind the fiduciary duty provisions of ERISA apply equally
to union fiduciaries. 1"6
While incidental benefits may accrue to persons other than partici-
pants in the plan, the paramount objective must remain the protec-
tion of retirement income." 7 If an investment incidentally benefits a
union or its members by providing job security and meets objective
criteria "appropriate to the goals of the portfolio," it may be given the
same consideration as alternative investments meeting those objective
criteria."" Such criteria include the requisites for establishing that an
114. See Feroleto Steel Co. v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 97 (1977). In this case, the Tax
Court held that a major loan from a pension plan to a corporation's majority
shareholder (who in turn lent it to the corporation at almost twice the interest rate)
violated the exclusive benefit rule of I.R.C. § 401(a). The Court stated that by so
holding "we do not mean to imply that the exclusive benefit rule is contravened
whenever a benefit inures to someone other than the employees or their beneficiaries
as the result of an investment of the funds of an employee trust. However, under the
facts of this case the benefit to the third party is not merely an incidental side effect of
an investment of trust assets, but is rather a major purpose of the investment." Id. at
113. Following Feroleto Steel, the Tax Court held in Shelby U.S. Distributors, Inc. v.
Comm'r that although "the employers, their officers, and the trustees may all have
derived some indirect benefit from the use of the trust funds, it appears that the trust
was also allowed to earn a reasonable return on its investments and that there was no
channeling of trust profits into the hands of individuals." 71 T.C. 874, 885 (1979).
See also Time Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 258 F.2d 237, 238 (9th Cir. 1958) (Internal
Revenue Code's use of word "exclusive" allows substantial indirect benefits to accrue
to an employer, "so long as the direct pecuniary benefits still run to the employee").
115. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1976) ("the assets of a plan shall never inure to
the benefit of an employer" before stating an exclusive benefit rule almost identical to
the one contained in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)). The Supreme Court noted in NLRB
v. Amax Coal Co. that § 403(c)(1) "specifically insulate[s] the trust from the employ-
er's interest." 453 U.S. 322, 333 (1981).
116. The definition of a fiduciary contained in ERISA includes any person exercis-
ing "discretionary authority or control" over a plan or its assets. See supra note 52.
117. See Lanoff, supra note 3, at 389.
118. Id. at 390.
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investment decision was made for the primary purpose of benefiting
plan participants, as set forth by the Internal Revenue Service."19
Some commentators theorize that if two investments are equal in
economic terms, "social" criteria may be taken into account. 20 The
application of this theory is difficult in practice, however, because few
investments can be considered equal based upon economic criteria.' 2'
If investments are not actually equal, a money manager would have
to take "pro-union" factors into account, if at all, when two potential
investments were approximately equal. For example, a bank could
invest in a project employing unionized workers if economic analysis
of both projects revealed approximately equal investment status. The
"approximately equal" concept allows money managers limited flexi-
bility in deciding when to apply noneconomic factors 22 and realisti-
cally takes into account the unequal choices facing money man-
agers. 12 3
For example, the Dreyfus Third Century Fund applies "social"
criteria to its investment choices, such as the equal employment op-
portunity record of a particular company.' 24 Traditional economic
criteria are applied after the list of "eligible companies" is estab-
lished. 125
119. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
Courts have developed objective criteria at common law, which are summarized
as follows: the investment's marketability; the length of the term of the investment;
the probable condition of the market as concerns reinvestment at the time the specific
investment matures; the aggregate value of the trust and the nature of other invest-
ments; the income requirements of the beneficiaries; earning capacities or other
assets of the beneficiaries; and inflation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, Sec. 227,
Comment 0, at 535. The Restatement lists other factors inapplicable to pension
funds.
120. See Langbein and Posner, supra note 3, at 92-95; Hutchinson and Cole,
supra note 3, at 1367; Lanoff, supra note 3, at 390. See also 9 PENS. REP. (BNA) No.
417, at 1550-51 (Nov. 1, 1982) (Department of Labor Opinion Letter).
121. Bowers, supra note 3, at 20; "Investment selections are not made in tangibly
measurable, 'all else being equal' settings, but rather with judgment calls and predic-
tions as well as hard data." Schotland, supra note 82, at 412.
122. Non-economic factors frequently enter into investment decisions. See Dym,
supra note 107, at 48 (prior to the point of investment decision making, "the ten-
dency is to sweep into the decision process all the information that is available").
123. This "approximately equal" standard, providing for limited flexibility in the
choice of investments, is a moderate approach, as compared with the "mandatory
social investment" approach taken in M. LEIBIG, SOCIAL INVESTMENTS AND THE LAW
(Studies in Pension Fund Investments No. 3, 1980).
124. Hearings, supra note 39, at 111-15 (statement of Jeffrey F. Friedman, Vice
President).
125. Id. at 114.
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One commentator has argued that the "benefits" to a participant in
a pension plan could be interpreted as more than mere payments upon
retirement. Rather, "benefits" such as job security could be in-
cluded. 126 This concept has been criticized as inaccurate because the
term "benefits" is used throughout ERISA in the narrow sense of cash
benefits. 127 However, it could be argued that if an economically wor-
thy investment were to provide job-security, this investment would
insure the viability of the fund and therefore be for the sole and
exclusive benefit of the plan's participants. 28 This view supports the
Congressional policy behind ERISA of assuring the "financial sound-
ness" of employee benefit plans. 29 Ensuring the viability of a pension
fund by providing job-security to those still contributing to the fund
could also satisfy the basic duty of a trustee at common law: the duty
of loyalty. 30 If, for example, the union-appointed trustees of a Taft-
Hartley plan were to instruct money managers to consider job security
as a possible factor in their considerations as to where to invest, the
pension fund itself would benefit through increased revenues. 3 In
126. See Ravikoff and Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and the
Prudent Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518, 532-33 (1980). Some union officials have
argued for a broad concept of "benefits". See Hearings, supra note 39, at 131 ("an
employee can enjoy the exclusive benefit of his pension fund only if he has a job
secure enough and long enough to collect his deferred income pension") (statement of
William Winpisinger, President, International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers); Id. at 142 ("preservation of jobs for union members, economic
stability and growth in the community they live in, and even the recognition of
workers' rights in other parts of our nation, may well create significant economic
benefits for beneficiaries of pension funds") (statement of Jacob Sheinkman, Secre-
tary-Treasurer, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union).
127. See Hutchinson and Cole, supra note 3, at 1368-69; Langbein and Posner,
supra note 3, at 102-03. Hutchinson and Cole note that the Department of Labor
initially applied the exclusive benefit rule to challenge allocations of pension funds
for administrative fees, expenses, and payments not in accordance with the plan.
They conclude that "there is little compelling need for the courts to apply the
exclusive purpose rule to investment issue." Id. at 1370, 1371.
128. Cf. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local
III v. Douglas, 646 F.2d 1211, 1215 (7th Cir. 1981) (trustees' decision regarding
payment of benefits, which insured fund's viability, was for sole and exclusive benefit
of beneficiaries).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976).
130. See G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES Sec. 543 (Rev. 2d ed.
1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 170 (1957).
131. The increased revenues would derive from additional union member contri-
butions.
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this way the trustees would be assuring the financial soundness of the
plan, thereby satisfying the common law duty of loyalty which was
essentially codified by ERISA.132
2. The Rule of Prudence
Under the common law, trustees were bound to invest with the
diligence and care which prudent persons "of discretion and intelli-
gence in such matters, employ in their own like affairs."' 133 If the
trustee claimed to have greater skills, a higher standard was ap-
plied.134 Under ERISA, the standard of prudence is one under which a
person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like
aims.' 35 Some commentators believe that this divergence from the
132. It is possible tliat the exclusive benefit rule does not differ from the common
law duty of loyalty. See Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, Ameri-
can Bar Association, ERISA and the Investment Management and Brokerage Indus-
tries: Five Years Later, 35 Bus. LAW. 189, 232 (1979) ("all indications are that the
'solely in the interest' and the 'exclusive purpose' requirements together equal the
trustee's common law duty of loyalty, and that each term has been used interchange-
ably to represent the same concept"). See also Langbein and Posner, supra note 3, at
97 (ERISA codified the duty of loyalty).
In Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971), trustees, who were
also officials of the United Mineworkers Union, (Boyle was President), were found to
have violated the common law duty of loyalty. The trustees had deposited the
pension funds in a UMW-owned bank, including some funds in an interest-free
account. The bank then bought stock in electric utility companies, in a bid to force
them (by the exercise of shareholders voting rights) to burn union-mined coal. The
court held that "the Fund was acting primarily for the collateral benefit of the Union
and the signatory operators in making most of its utility stock acquisitions." Id. at
1106. The court also said that Boyle "considers the Fund in effect the property of the
Union to be used in whatever manner the immediate and long-term objectives of the
Union warrant." Id at 1109. This case represents an extreme example of union-
appointed trustees controlling pension funds primarily to benefit the union. If de-
cided under ERISA, such actions by trustees would be clearly illegal as a violation of
fiduciary duty. See notes 101-104 and accompanying text. This Note is concerned
with the factors influencing the investment decision-making process, and whether
incidental benefits may be taken into consideration which benefit the union. There is
no doubt that such decisions cannot be made to primarily benefit the union.
133. In Re Bank of New York, 35 N.Y. 2d 512, 519, 323 N.E.2d. 700, 704, 364
N.Y.S.2d 164, 169 (1974) (citations omitted).
134. Ravikoff and Curzan, supra note 126, at 530. For a general discussion of the
topic, see Klevan, Fiduciary Responsibility Under ERISA's Prudent Man Rule: What
Are the Guideposts?, 44 J. TAX'N. 52 (1976)
135. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(B)(1976). Furthermore, any exculpatory provisions
in an agreement or plan instrument are void as against public policy. 29 U.S.C. §
1110(a) (1976).
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common law standard results in a standard which assumes expertise in
the area of investments. 36 In determining the prudence of an invest-
ment decision, the outcome is not determinative of the court's conclu-
sion. Rather, courts look to the "circumstances prevailing" 137 when
the decision was made and the alternatives available. 138 Therefore, as
a practical matter, professional money managers rely on records of the
factors influencing the decision-making process. 139
The Department of Labor has issued regulations pertaining to in-
vestment duties under the prudence rule. 140 The prudence of an in-
vestment will be judged with regard to the role the investment plays
within the portfolio as a whole.' 4' At common law the investment
decision was judged individually. 142 Prior to ERISA, courts did not
allow a fiduciary to offset losses from one investment against the gains
of another investment. 143 This divergence from the common law al-
lows money managers somewhat greater flexibility in making invest-
ment decisions. Once it is established that the investment is economi-
cally competitive, the prudence of ah individual investment decision
that has taken "pro-union" factors into account will be judged in
relation to the role it plays in the portfolio. 144
136. See Lamon, supra note 99, at 522; Committee on Investments by Fiduciaries,
Probate and Trust Division, ABA Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law,
Fiduciary Responsibility and the Employee's (sic) Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 12 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 285, 298 (1976) (courts will evaluate fiduciary
actions in light of actions of the best fund managers).
137. This language is used in ERISA itself. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(B) (1976).
138. Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n, Glaziers and Glassworkers Pension Plan, 507
F. Supp. 378, 384 (D. Haw. 1980) (risky real estate investment). See also Kniep, 40
INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 11.01, § 11.04, at 11-20. (ERISA Supp. 1982) ("ERISA does
not require a fiduciary to be omniscient or infallible. Its main requisite is that, in
making each investment, the fiduciary act on the basis of awareness, inquiry, consid-
eration and effective monitoring").
139. Lamon, supra note 99, at 522.
140. 29 C.F.R. § 2550. 404(a) (1979).
141. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,222 (1979) (discussion of the regulation).
142. See In Re Bank of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 512, 517, 323 N.E.2d 700, 703, 364
N.Y.S.2d 164, 168 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 213 (1959).
143. See Committee on Investments by Fiduciaries, Probate and Trust Division,
A.B.A. Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, supra note 136, at 293.
144. Diversification of plan assets, mandated by ERISA, is beyond the scope of
this Note. It should be noted, however, that diversification, aside from providing
security for pension funds, can also be profitable. For example, the "World Market
Portfolio," which includes "a weighted combination of equities, bonds, cash, U.S.
real estate and the monetary metals" and "covers the capital markets of the United
States, . . . Europe, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Canada and Australia" was
worth $2 trillion in 1959 and $11 trillion by 1980. Bernstein, Winning Big by Playing
It Safe, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1983, at 241.
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The Department of Labor regulations do not specifically prohibit
"pro-union" factors from being considered by a fiduciary. 145 If a
broad investment policy were formulated that arbitrarily excluded all
non-union corporations from consideration, it clearly would be im-
prudent. If, on the other hand, the investment policy allowed for the
exclusion of certain corporations from possible investment after indi-
vidual examination on the merits, the exclusion may be prudent. 14 It
should be noted, however, that money managers have been swayed
toward a conservative investment posture by ERISA's prudence re-
quirements147 and may not be willing to follow all instructions given
to them. 148 The broad definition of fiduciary contained in ERISA,1 49
the fact that fiduciaries are held personally liable in the case of a
breach of fiduciary duty,150 the possibility of liability for a breach by a
co-fiduciary,' 5 1 combine with the possibility of punitive damages, 152
to encourage a conservative investment posture.
As in the case of the exclusive purpose rule, 15 3 if two investments,
theoretically equal in economic terms, are available and one of the
investments incidentally benefits a union by providing job security for
its members, the latter investment may be made on the basis of the
job-security feature. While the job-security enhancement aspect of the
145. Weintraub, Fiduciary Investment Duties Associated With Employee-Benefit
Plans, TRs. & ESTS., Feb. 1981, at 6.
146. Lanoff, supra note 3, at 391. Consider the following statement of Michael
Locker, president, Corporate Data Exchange, Inc.: "Clearly, without violating the
ERISA prudence rule, a committee of employees, acting in an advisory capacity and
not actually responsible for buying and selling stocks, could carve out broad areas in
which they could choose not to have their pension fund assets invested." Hearings,
supra note 39, at 110.
147. Lamon, supra note 99, at 527. As mentioned earlier, pension funds are
invested mostly through group annuity contracts offered by life insurance companies
or trusts administered by a bank or trust company. See supra note 45 and accompa-
nying text.
148. See supra note 79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possible
refusal by money managers to consider such instructions.
149. See supra note 52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition.
150. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1976).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (1976).
152. See Jimenez v. Pioneer Diecasters, 549 F. Supp. 677 (C.D. Cal. 1982);
Bittner v. Sadoff and Rudoy Industries, 490 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Wis. 1980); but see
Calhoun v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
153. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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investment cannot substitute for objective criteria,', 4 it is difficult to
find two investments which are equal based upon economic crite-
ria. 155
C. The Problem of Dual Loyalties
Fiduciaries may also serve as union officers or representatives under
ERISA. 15 The potential for a conflict of loyalties is apparent. This
conflict is not new: the Taft-Hartley Act, providing for jointly admin-
istered trusts,5 7 also contained a "sole and exclusive benefit" rule,15 8
leading to cases considering the problem of dual loyalties of trustees. 15 9
The congressional purpose in providing for joint employer-union
representation was to combat bribery of union officials, extortion by
union officials and the potential for abuse of pension funds if they
were left solely in the control of union officers. 6 0 Congress did not
intend that pension funds would be used as a "war chest" for orga-
nized labor,'"' as would be the case if unions used funds for their own
benefit, while employees who have contributed would have "no legal
rights and [would] not receive the kind of benefits to which they are
entitled."'' 6 2 Clearly, Congress did not intend that pension funds
154. Lanoff, supra note 3, at 389. For a discussion of the requisite objective
criteria, see supra note 119.
155. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
156. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1976).
157. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
158. Section 302(c)(5) provides in part that payments may be made from employ-
ers to employee representatives paid to a trust fund established "for the sole and
exclusive benefit" of the employees, their families and dependents. See 29 U.S.C. §
186(c)(5)(1976).
159. See. e.g., Toensing v. Brown, 374 F.Supp. 191 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aJJ'd 528
F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1975).
160. Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1959).
161. Id.
162. 93 CONG. REC. 4877 (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1312 (1948).
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would be used for the direct benefit of unions or union officials." 3
This however, does not preclude the accrual of indirect benefits to a
union or its members.1
6 4
A union-appointed trustee may not have dual loyalties; the trustee's
fiduciary duties with respect to the trust must be paramount. 6 5 Rec-
ommendations of an appointing party may be taken, but these recom-
mendations are neither binding nor obligatory. 166 The trustees must
exercise "independent judgment."' 6 7 In fact, in the vast majority of
cases, bloc voting occurs,16 8 implying that the respective interests
16 9 of
163. Without the joint-administration provision, pension funds would "become a
racket." Id.
164. Culinary Workers and Bartenders Union, Local 596, Health and Welfare
Trust v. Gateway Cafe, Inc., 91 Wash. 2d 353, 588 P.2d 1334 (1979). In Culinary
Workers, the Supreme Court of Washington held that a trustee may have some
degree of collateral union interest, under the exclusive benefit provision of Taft-
Hartley. Id. at 361, 588 P.2d at 1340. The court also stated that "some degree of
collateral interest is permissible" under ERISA, because of the inclusion of Section
408(c)(3), allowing a union official to be a fiduciary. Id. at 362, 588 P.2d at 1341.
The court noted that no breach of fiduciary obligations would be found "where there
is no showing that the fiduciary's collateral interest impaired a trust fund's operation
or a beneficiary's interest." Id. at 363, 588 P.2d at 1341. See also Gilliam v.
Edwards, 492 F.Supp. 1255 (D.N.J. 1980) (trustee of fund was also business manager
of union local); Lugo v. Employees Retirement Fund, 388 F.Supp. 997 (E.D.N.Y.
1975) (pension plan does not violate sole and exclusive benefit rule where it indirectly
furthers economic interests of employer), a3f'd 529 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 826 (1976).
165. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981). "The language and legislative
history of Sec. 302(c)(5) and ERISA ... demonstrate that an employee benefit fund
trustee is a fiduciary whose duty to the trust beneficiaries must overcome any loyalty
to the interest of the party that appointed him." Id. at 334. See NLRB v. Constr. and
Gen. Laborers' Local 1140, 577 F.2d 16, 21 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S.
1070 (1979); Morgan v. Laborers Pension Trust Fund, 433 F.Supp. 518, 530 (N.D.
Cal. 1977).
166. Toensing v. Brown, 528 F.2d 69, 72 (9th Cir. 1975).
167. Id. Accord Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 234 NLRB 1238 (1978), aff'd sub
nom. Cent. Fla. Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.
1981).
168. J. Brooks, supra note 56, at 6 (union members tend to dominate multi-
employer boards of trustees).
169. Pension funds seem to have escaped the common law formula that no person
can "serve two masters". If the rule were followed literally, neither management
personnel nor union officials could serve as trustees. This comports neither with
ERISA, which allows a union member, as a "party in interest", to be a fiduciary, 29
U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3), nor with common practice, see supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
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a union and an employer are taken into account when trustees make
decisions. 70 This is not necessarily inconsistent with fiduciary du-
ties. '71
VI. Conclusion
Organized labor would like to influence the decision-making proc-
ess involving pension fund investments. At the present time, this input
is minimal, considering the vast pension funds over whose investment
policies unions have no input whatsoever. Unions will attempt in the
future to preserve jobs through bargaining over the right to recom-
mend investment policies to money managers. The fiduciary status of
money managers conservatively influences their investment posture
and thus discourages their support for such a program by organized
labor. It is submitted that any recommendations made must be nar-
rowly formulated. One proposal, for example, could be to recom-
mend that pension funds be used to "invest in unionized companies
where such investments are economically competitive." If the persons
making such recommendations do not make their interest in job pres-
ervation the paramount interest, they will not have violated their
fiduciary duties under ERISA. The test of whether fiduciary duties
have been violated can never be whether the investments were equal,
because such absolute equality is rarely found. Courts should apply a
materiality standard when interpreting the fiduciary duty provision of
ERISA. The issue should be whether the investment decision was
materially affected by the "pro-union" factors. Some flexibility in the
decision-making process should be allowed as long as the paramount
interest of all fiduciaries remains the retirement income security of
employees, past and present.
Gerald P. Cunningham
170. Welch and Wilson, Applicability of Traditional Principles of Trust Law to
Union and Management Representatives Administering Taft-Hartley Trusts, 23 LAB.
L. J. 671, 673 (1972).
171. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 344 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens stated "(n)othing in the statute or the legislative history suggests that
differences along labor-management lines are in any way inconsistent with the
trustees' fiduciary duty to the trust beneficiaries." Id.
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